All of the 48 island nations (sovereign states surrounded by water), including the UK, Japan, and Indonesia, rely on just 126 undersea cables to provide them with access to the world’s internet.
These cables are often no thicker than a garden hose, leaving them vulnerable to damage. The International Cable Protection Committee (ICPC) reports 150 to 200 faults are reported on undersea cables each year. Of those, 70 to 80 percent resulted from accidental human activities, primarily anchors from shipping vessels. The rest are technical failures or natural disasters.
In September 2025, two cables linking Europe and the Middle East were cut, causing degraded internet connections in multiple countries in Asia and the Middle East. The ICPC said the damage was likely caused by commercial shipping activity, but not before concerns of sabotage by Yemen’s Houthi rebels were raised.
Now more than ever, sabotage of these cables is a key cause for concern.
In April 2026, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) revealed it had mapped cable locations in the Strait of Hormuz, placing the region’s digital infrastructure at risk. Elsewhere, the Irish government was recently warned about the danger and consequences of its cables being attacked, and the UK military has tracked Russian submarines performing reconnaissance on cables in the North Atlantic.
To gauge which of the island nations are most at risk of being cut off by accident or design, we looked at the number of undersea cables connecting them, the level of fishing activity that could cause accidental damage, and their proximity to conflict areas that could result in malicious damage. Scores range from 0 to 8, with 0 representing the least risk and eight the most.
Which island nations are most at risk of undersea cable attacks and damage?
New Zealand was at the least risk with a score of 0. It has more than 10 different undersea cables, no engagement or proximity to armed conflict, and relatively modest industrial fishing activity.
Iceland was the most at-risk European nation with an overall score of five. Brunei and Bahrain were the most at-risk Asian island nations, each with a score of six. Dominica and Haiti both scored six and were the most at-risk of the island nations in the Americas.
In terms of population, cable damage in Haiti would have the most significant impact due to the island’s relatively large population of 11.6 million people. As a general trend, the most populous countries tend to face the least risk. Indonesia, the Philippines, and Japan all scored three.
How many connections to undersea cables does each island nation have?
The number of cables reaching island nations varies widely and roughly correlates with population. The UK was the most connected island nation with 67 cable landing points. 32 of these provide direct continental connections. Singapore, Japan, and Indonesia all have more than 30 cables each.
Five of the smaller, less-populated island nations are connected by just one cable. Tuvalu, for example, is connected by the 668 km VAKA cable. This is not directly connected to the continental mainland. Rather, Tuvalu’s Vaka cable is a spur off a larger regional system, meaning resilience depends on both the branch and upstream trunk segments.
Nauru’s initial connection is to the 2,250 km East Micronesia Cable System (EMCS). The EMCS links into regional systems such as HANTRU-1 and onward to Guam, so disruptions can occur at multiple points upstream.
Kiribati relies heavily on a spur of the 13,700 km Southern Cross NEXT cable for connectivity. This cable provides direct connections to continental landing stations in the US and Australia.
A prime example of the risk involved in an island nation’s dependency on a single cable is Tonga – one of the most digitalized countries in the South Pacific. In 2022, the 827 km Tonga Cable was severed when an undersea volcano erupted, leading to a nationwide loss of internet. Although limited satellite connectivity was established in a few days, full fiber connectivity wasn’t restored for over five weeks.
While this is a particularly extreme example (most cable issues are normally repaired within two weeks), it does show the importance of redundancy. Tonga has since been connected to the 14,000 km Hawaiki submarine cable, which connects the US and Australia.
Direct continental connectivity lessens island nations’ reliance on intermediary cables. Overall, we identified 10 island nations that lack direct continental redundancy and a further seven that depend on a single international cable system. These configurations significantly increase exposure to outages caused by both accidental damage and deliberate disruption.
A total of seven countries are directly connected to two continental cables. In the case of Cuba, one of these is owned by a foreign government. The GTMO-1 cable runs from Guantanamo Bay to Dania Beach in Florida and is owned by the US government.
Where are undersea cables located?
Visual representations of undersea cables, such as the Submarine Cable Map, provide stylized routing rather than exact positions.
However, it’s still possible to find (or infer) planned routes. In rare cases, the owners of the cables publish the coordinates on their websites, primarily as a way to help fishing vessels avoid them. Equally, authorities often warn commercial craft when a new cable is being laid. For example, the UK Hydrographic Office issues Notices to Mariners that provide details of planned cable routes and the navigational charts affected.
The notices don’t always name the company laying the cable, but they do tend to specify when they are telecoms cables. They list a series of coordinates accompanied by warnings for mariners to navigate with caution.
While it can be difficult to correlate the coordinates with known cables in heavily cabled areas such as the North Sea, doing so elsewhere is often more straightforward, particularly when the cable owners are identified. For example, we mapped the partial route of a cable connecting Indonesia with the Philippines.
We also mapped the partial route of an internet backbone cable that (in its entirety) provides connectivity for islands such as Comoros, Madagascar, and the Seychelles.
In some cases, the cable provider itself issues notices and route information. For example, we found the longitude and latitude of the route for two cables connecting the UK and mainland Europe. These could be correlated with available public information on existing cables.
Note that these sources typically indicate planned or approximate routes rather than precise as-laid cable positions.
Cable routes may sometimes be inferred during installation using real-time AIS ship tracking. Sites such as marinetraffic.com show vessel names, routes, ports, and history. By entering the name of a cable-laying ship – such as the Leonardo Da Vinci (see image below) – you can see its past and present course. This creates the potential for known cable projects to be mapped with a relatively high degree of confidence.
How often are undersea cables damaged?
As we’ve already noted, the ICPC reports that there are typically 150 to 200 cable incidents each year. Roughly 20 percent of these are damaged by abrasion and natural forces. For example, in 2006, a magnitude 7.0 earthquake off southern Taiwan triggered underwater landslides that broke 14 cables in 14 hours.
Mike Clare, the ICPC’s marine environmental advisor, says that small islands in places like the South Pacific, where tropical storms, earthquakes, and volcanoes are commonplace, are “particularly vulnerable.” He believes natural cable damage will worsen with climate change.
Some older cables are nearing their average 25-year lifespan, making them more susceptible to “shunt faults.” These occur when a section of cable wears thin due to repeated movement across the seabed.
However, the majority of cable damage (approximately 80%) is caused by human activity, such as fishing or anchoring. For example, in 2022, cables connecting the Shetland Islands to the north of the UK were accidentally severed by a fishing vessel, resulting in widespread outages on the island.
Malicious damage tends to be difficult to prove but is often suspected. In 2023, the Matsu Islands off the coast of Taiwan experienced repeated internet outages when two submarine cables were severed within weeks of each other. Taiwanese authorities linked the damage to Chinese fishing vessels. Chinese vessels were also alleged to have intentionally damaged the Trans-Pacific Express (TPE) Cable System and the TPKM-3, both of which have landing stations in Taiwan.
Russia, too, has been accused of using civilian vessels to damage cables. A report from the Research Institute for Democracy, Society, and Emerging Technology (DSET) states that, in the last five years, vessels were directly linked to China and Russia in eight out of the 10 suspected sabotage incidents in which a suspect vessel was identified.
Although cutting one or two cables in well-connected island nations won’t cause a complete outage, even a small reduction in overall capacity can be costly. Furthermore, the minimal effort needed to damage cables makes it an effective way to undermine confidence and imply the threat of a larger attack.
Beyond suspected covert activity, states are also developing more explicit capabilities. China has successfully tested a cable-cutting device that works at depths of up to 4,000m. The technology is designed for use with China’s advanced manned and unmanned submersibles and represents a more overt show of strength.
Given their reliance on undersea cables, island nations such as the UK want to protect them from malicious damage. A 2025 Joint Committee report for the UK Government suggested introducing tougher penalties for malicious cable damage and the diversification of cable routes “to avoid pinch-points of high-value targets.”
The risk to telecommunication cables in the Strait of Hormuz
Recent reports suggest that Iran has mapped undersea telecommunication cables in the Strait of Hormuz, raising concerns that they could be targeted if hostilities escalate. This prompts two key questions: how important are these cables to global communications and would damaging them cause noticeable disruption?
Seven undersea fibre optic cables pass through the Strait of Hormuz. Three aren’t currently fully operational (SeaMeWe-6 and Fibre in Gulf (FIG) are due to go live in 2027). The Pearls segment of 2Africa (the part reaching the Gulf) is scheduled to go live in 2026.
- FALCON
- Gulf Bridge International Cable System/Middle East North Africa Cable System (GBICS/MENA)
- 2Africa
- Asia Africa Europe-1 (AAE-1)
- Fibre in Gulf (FIG)
- SeaMeWe-6
- OMRAN/EPEG.
Of the four operational cables, the most important is Asia Africa Europe-1 (AAE-1). This provides one of the lowest-latency and highest-capacity routes between France and China, and is a key route for time-dependent traffic. The section of the AAE-1 that passes through the Strait of Hormuz is a spur off the main cable. Nevertheless, a cut here would impact Gulf countries that Iran has already targeted militarily, namely, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE.
The FALCON cable is another key regional system, with landing points in Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE.
The GBICS/MENA, FALCON, and OMRAN/EPEG cables all have landing points in Iran. Damage to them would therefore impact Iranian communications. In light of this. and the relative importance of each cable, the best target would appear to be the AAE-1.
In reality, Iran would be unlikely to target a specific cable. Most suspected malicious attacks on undersea cables are carried out by vessels dragging their anchors for several miles. Given that the Strait of Hormuz is 29 nautical miles wide at its narrowest point, doing this would likely damage several cables at once.
Such a scenario played out in the Red Sea in 2025, when multiple undersea submarine cables, including the FALCON cable, were severed. This resulted in regional slowdowns as well as delays of up to 30% on connections between India and Europe.
Earlier incidents show similar patterns: the FALCON cable was severed by a dragged anchor in 2020, resulting in Yemen losing 80 percent of its capacity. The damage also affected speeds in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. A 2024 disruption to AAE-1, alongside SEACOM and EIG, affected roughly a quarter of traffic between Europe, Asia, and the Middle East.
However, the Strait of Hormuz is not quite the same kind of chokepoint as the Red Sea. While it is critical for Gulf connectivity, global traffic can often be rerouted via alternative paths. The impact, therefore, would be uneven: countries with limited redundancy, such as Bahrain, Qatar, and Kuwait, would experience the most immediate and severe slowdowns.
The greater risk lies not in the initial damage, but in repair delays. Under normal conditions, cables can often be fixed within one to two weeks. In conflict zones, however, repair vessels may be unable to operate safely, extending outages for months, as seen in previous Red Sea incidents involving AAE-1.
How easy is it to repair damaged cables?
The global submarine cable network is maintained by an aging fleet of around 50 ships. These are primarily operated by Orange Marine, SubCom, Alcatel Submarine Networks, Global Marine Group, and OMS Group. It’s a highly concentrated and potentially fragile repair ecosystem, particularly as the majority of these will be busy laying cable at any given point.
Indeed, the ICPC lists just four dedicated cable repair ships: the Wave Sentinel and Sovereign (both owned by Global Marine Systems Limited), the Kemj & Biriusa (owned by the Russian Navy), and the Ile d’Aix (owned by Alcatel Submarine Networks).
Each ship can only focus on one repair at a time. Matthew Bowden, Director and General Manager at Red Penguin Marine, says, “repair capability can be used up quite quickly” if multiple cable issues occur.
In addition, while some island nations are relatively accessible, others may face extended delays as vessels travel thousands of miles to reach them.
Alasdair Wilkie of the Atlantic Cable Maintenance Agreement (ACMA) says that repair ships typically leave port within 24 hours following a notification of a cable fault, and travel at around 12 knots. A repair in the Irish Sea could involve two days of travel and around five days of repair. For a fault in the mid-Atlantic, it could take “about seven days to get there and then probably eight to 10 days to do the repair.”
For a cable repair in the Pacific, a ship (such as the Cable Retriever stationed in Subic, Philippines) may need to travel roughly 5,000 km to reach the site of the fault. This would take at least 10 days of smooth, uninterrupted sailing before repair work could begin.
To better protect their interests, some island nations are developing a sovereign repair capability. In 2025, the Japanese government announced that it would provide subsidies worth hundreds of millions of dollars to the NEC corporation to support the acquisition of cable repair vessels. Vodafone and the European Subsea Cables Association (ESCA) have both suggested the UK Government should consider acquiring its own repair ships. A Joint Committee report asks that this be done before 2030.
While buying a vessel capable of repairing undersea cables might be possible for wealthy island nations, the cost of such vessels is beyond the means of many. A single repair ship costs approximately $300 million to build, which is more than the GDP of some small island nations.
Who owns the undersea cables linking island nations?
Laying new cables takes a significant amount of time and money. According to Tomas Lamanauskas, Deputy Secretary-General of the International Telecommunication Union, “While shorter cables cost millions, the longer ones can run into the hundreds of millions [of Euros].” The European Commission estimates the cost of undersea telecommunications cables at between €25,000 and €45,000 per km.
Some cables are owned and operated by a single telecom or manufacturing company that sells capacity to national ISPs and tech companies like Google. In the context of island nations, we identified several instances where single operators controlled major communication routes.
Single operators
EXA Infrastructure is a wholesale telecom infrastructure company. Although UK-based, it is ultimately owned by I Squared Capital (a US infrastructure investment firm). It owns:
- EXA North and South cable that services the UK and Ireland
- AEC-1 that services Ireland
- EXA Express cable that services the UK and Ireland
- Pan European Crossing (UK-Belgium) cable that services the UK
China’s Peace Cable International is a subsidiary of Hengtong Group, a manufacturer of fibre-optic cables and submarine communication systems. It owns:
- The 25,000 km PEACE Cable that services Malta, Cyprus, the Maldives, and the Seychelles
Global Cloud Xchange (GCX), which was previously known under the FLAG (Fibre Links Around the Globe) brand. GCX is owned by 3i Infrastructure (a Jersey-incorporated, closed-ended investment company). It owns:
- The 10,300 km FALCON cable that services the Maldives and Bahrain.
- The 3,400 km HAWK cable that services Cyprus.
Tata Communications is another major submarine cable operator. It is headquartered in India and forms part of the wider Tata Group. It owns:
- The 22,300 km Tata TGN-Pacific cable that services Japan.
- The 3,200 km T3 cable that services Mauritius.
- The 4,031 km Tata TGN-Gulf cable that services Bahrain.
- The 3,578 km Tata TGN-Western Europe cable that services the UK
- The 8,000 km Tata TGN-Atlantic South cable that services the UK
- The 3,200 km i2i Cable Network (i2icn) cable that serves Singapore
- The 3,175 km Tata TGN-Tata Indicom cable that serves Singapore
- The 6,700 km Tata TGN-Intra Asia (TGN-IA) cable that serves Singapore and the Philippines
Telstra is Australia’s largest telecommunications and technology company. It owns:
- The 36,500 km EAC-C2C cable that services Japan, the Philippines, Singapore, and Taiwan.
Carrier consortiums
GCX, Tata Communications, and Telstra are members of several consortiums. These consortiums are typically made up of telecom carriers from different countries, with each owning some capacity and governance rights. Carrier consortiums sell capacity to ISPs, governments, and enterprises.
Major carrier consortium cables connecting island nations include:
- APCN-2 (14 telecom companies) – connects to Japan, Taiwan, Singapore, and the Philippines
- SEA-ME-WE 5 (18 telecom companies) – connects to Sri Lanka, Indonesia and Singapore
- Asia-America Gateway (16 telecom companies) – connects to Brunei and the Philippines
- SEA-US (7 telecom companies) – connects to the Philippines, Micronesia, Palau, and Indonesia
Hyperscaler involvement
A hyperscaler is a large cloud computing provider that operates massive data centers at global scale to deliver services like storage, computing power, and networking.
In the last decade, hyperscalers such as Google, Meta, and Amazon Web Services have been taking a major ownership stake in consortium cables or establishing fully private cables with partners landing them.
Examples of the former include:
- 2Africa (Meta-led consortium) – connects to the Seychelles, Bahrain, Madagascar, Comoros, and the UK
- Echo (Meta/ Google-led consortium) – connects to Palau, Indonesia, and Singapore
- Asia Connect Cable-1 (Google-led consortium) – connects to Timor-Leste, Philippines, Indonesia, and Singapore
- JUPITER (Meta/ Google-led consortium) – connects to Japan
- Bifrost (Meta-led consortium) – connects to Indonesia, Philippines and Singapore
- Apricot (Meta-led consortium) – connects to Indonesia, Philippines, Taiwan, Japan and Singapore
Fully private cables include:
- Dhivaru – owned by Google and connects to the Maldives
- Honomoana – owned by Google and connects to New Zealand
- Tabua – owned by Google and connects to Fiji
- Fastnet – owned by Amazon and connects to Ireland.
Conclusion
The vulnerability of island nations to undersea cable disruption is less a question of if outages will occur and more a question of when and how severely they will be felt. Connectivity is highly concentrated, and in some cases dependent on single systems or indirect “spur” branches. While major economies such as the UK or Japan benefit from extensive redundancy and multiple landing points, smaller and more remote nations remain structurally exposed.
This exposure is compounded by the difficulty of monitoring and protecting cable infrastructure. The growing geopolitical sensitivity around subsea infrastructure, alongside reported reconnaissance and alleged sabotage activities, highlights how these systems are increasingly viewed as strategic assets.
Ultimately, resilience depends on redundancy, repair capacity, and diversification of ownership and routes. Yet these safeguards are unevenly distributed. Repair fleets are limited, cable ownership is increasingly concentrated among a small number of global operators and hyperscalers, and the cost of building alternative systems remains prohibitive for many island states.
Methodology
We defined an island nation as a fully island sovereign state with no territory on a continental mainland. Our list was composed from data available at reference.org. We’ve included Taiwan despite its limited recognition. Australia was excluded as it is a continent rather than an island. Dependencies such as the Isle of Man and Guernsey were also excluded.
For general location information of undersea cable routes, we used the Submarine Cable Map. When defining connections to continents, we focused on connections to the continental land mass rather than connections to other islands.
Each country’s relative risk of losing connectivity was calculated using three metrics.
The first was the amount of fishing activity, as measured by the number of fish caught. We used figures for each region as a whole due to the lack of data for a per-country value. The regions were Asia, Africa, Oceania, Europe, and the Americas. Figures for the tonnage of fish caught in each region were provided by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.
- Countries in a region that caught between 0 and 10 million tonnes received a score of 0.
- Countries in a region that caught between 10 and 20 million tonnes received a score of 1.
- Countries in a region that caught over 20 million tonnes received a score of 2.
The second metric we used was each country’s proximity to conflict. We used the Global Conflict Map for data, which tracks active armed conflicts worldwide.
- Countries not near to, nor engaged in, conflict received a score of 0.
- Countries that were near to, or engaged in, a minor conflict received a score of 1.
- Countries that were near to, or engaged in, a major war received a score of 2.
The final metric we used was the number of cables that landed in each country via the ocean.
- Countries with at least 10 cables received a score of 0.
- Countries with between six and ten calves received a score of 2.
- Countries with up to five cables received a score of 4.
The scores for the three metrics were summed to generate an overall risk score.
